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There has been a popular misconception that Africa’s numerous wars and conflicts are 
caused by ethnicity. This paper attempts to demonstrate that this idea is mistaken. Ethnic 
characteristics are a universal and ubiquitous feature of humanity. It is how they are 
accommodated in the state and the policies, which govern their social expression, which 
ensure whether they become easy and enriching facilities in the plural societies of our 
times, or exploitable reference points by rival ruling or dominant elites.  The argument 
here is that, it is elitist rivalry, which mobilizes ethnic sentiments for narrow political, 
social and economic objectives. 
 
As we enter the fourth year of the 21
st century, Africa is searching for a suitable mix of 
ideas which are developmentally realizable and addresses the question of how to create 
modernity which is both African and eventually cosmopolitan. This formula by 
implication points to the fact that Africa needs a workable paradigm for political order, 
which answers to the economic, social and cultural challenges and peculiarities of 
African society without suggesting exceptionalism in an increasingly globalizing world in 
which universal institutions and shared political ideals are becoming more the rule than 
the exception. This will require that we eschew imitative or a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach. 
One of the popular insights of our times is that, while we acknowledge the global we 
must permit fully the celebration of the local. Africa’s solutions will need to be defined 
and implementationally advised by policies, which reflect the cultural realities of the 
society they are intended to serve. The solutions would need to be constructed on African 
cultural characteristics, the cultures of mass society. But such social engineering would 
need to acknowledge both in theory and practice tolerance, social inclusivity and the 
coexistence of cultural diversity. 
   2
Africa’s developmental malaise continues. Most African states are in serious economic 
stagnation or at best developmental torpor, and have for decades been in this condition. 
From the five-year development plans of the early independence period, to the Lagos 
Plan of Action, Africans have hungered for answers to the challenge of pervasive and 
benumbing under-development. The New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD) is the latest attempt at a development paradigm for the continent, produced 
largely under the aegis of the Mbeki administration in South Africa, closely supported by 
the Nigerian, Algerian and Senegalese governments.   
 
The NEPAD initiative will need to turn the cross-border nature of African cultural groups 
and ethnicities to the advantage of African people. Tolerance and democratic trans-border 
institutions would need to be encouraged. With war and conflict rather generalized on the 
continent, there are today more refugees on the African continent than any other 
continent in this world. According to World Health Organization (WHO) Regional 
Director for Africa Dr Ebrahim Samba, 23 of the 46 countries in the WHO African 
Region were experiencing some kind of emergency, which had now created at least nine 
million refugees and over 35 million internally displaced persons across the continent. 
(OCHA.2003) This exposes greater numbers of Africans to xenophobia and mistreatment 
at the hands of fellow Africans. If the ideals of NEPAD and the unity of Africans are to 
be realized, Africans will need to quickly move away from regarding their fellow 
Africans, who happen to be citizens of other African countries or refugees as, at best, 
undesirable rivals and, at worst, enemies. 
 
A cursory examination of the history of post-colonial Africa reveals that, in the first 
decade of African independence, the elected governments, which opened the 
independence era in Africa either changed character and became autocratic one-party 
regimes, or lost power to military-bureaucratic dictatorships. For decades none were 
voted out of government and the lesson, which many drew from this, was that the only 
free elections Africa has experienced are the elections, which ushered in governments at 
independence.  During the 1970s and 80s, military coups and consequent military 
dictatorships gained ground in one country after the other. From the late 1980s to the 90s, 
movements and struggles for democracy steadily increased. By the mid-1990s African 
ruling groups had become more sensitive to charges of mis-government and 
undemocratic practice. It became fashionable for military rulers and strongmen to seek 
legitimacy to their rule through the ballot-box.  
 
Failed States, Wars and Warlordism: The Profile 
War and warlordism have taken over large parts of the continent. War is sweeping across 
Africa more decisively than the growth and consolidation of democratic practice. As 
things stand today, about two-thirds of the continent is embroiled in various levels of   3
conflict and war, and most attempts to stem the rising tide of war have been, at best, only 
limitedly successful. At no time in Africa’s history over the past hundred years has war 
on this continent been so generalised. Some of these wars are civil wars while others are 
interstate wars.  Increasingly, civil and inter-state wars are becoming inter-connected. 
Currently, six of the conflicts and civil wars show little sign of resolution.  
 
About 60% of the deaths from armed conflict in the contemporary world have occurred in 
the region. Arms exports to the region nearly doubled over the year as different factions 
fought not only over territory but also for valuable mineral resources. During the past ten 
years, over half of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa have been engaged in armed 
conflict or confronted by a significant threat from armed groups at one point or the other. 
If military assistance and funding of opposition groups and mercenaries are taken into 
account, military expenditure in the region totalled about 12 billion (USD) in 2003. With 
the exception of South Africa, over the past decade, spending on arms in sub-Saharan 
Africa increased by 15% at a time when the region’s economic growth rose by less than 
1% in real terms. In March 2003, Komla Siamevi, of the WHO Regional Office for 
Africa, Brazzaville put the economic losses due to wars in Africa at $15 billion per year. 
(OCHA.2003) 
 
Disease is rife, poverty excruciating, education in decline; administrative mis-
management, corruption, violations of human rights and mis-rule have been rampant for 
most of the post-colonial period. Inert and corrupted bureaucracies have been spawned in 
societies in which graft and pilferage have become commonplace.  People in bureaucratic 
organizations treat their office as agencies through which they make money, largely 
because their salaries can hardly meet their needs in an ever-inflationary economy.   
Massive and crushing international debt-burdens, unfavourable terms of trade, high tariff 
walls, subsidies and protectionism prevent African agriculture from penetrating lucrative 
international markets. Only unity of purpose and common action by African states will 
strengthen Africa’s position in international trade negotiations. The sum total, of these 
factors and conditions have translated into the realities of what in recent years has come 
to be described as the “failed state” syndrome.  Some observers suggest that all African 
states are headed in that direction, while others deny this. (Tull.2003.429-446) 
 
“Failed states” are states at differing stages of transition from order to disorder, from 
stability to chaos. These are states whose developmental and governmental ineptitude has 
become so entrenched that they fail to live up to universal expectations of the state in the 
contemporary world.  The overwhelming majority of “failed states” are in Africa. “Failed 
states" are typified by patterns of governmental paralysis within a state. The hallmark is 
that, the groups, which are entrusted with the bearing of arms on behalf of the state face 
rivals, mainly putschists, warlords, brigands and vigilantes who terrorize town and   4
countryside extracting goods and services from a terrified population. In factions and 
gangs, they fight each other and the state forces for control and access to resources. This 
invariably triggers involuntary migration, rampant human rights abuses, expanding 
starvation and aggravated conditions of disease infestation, HIV expansion and 
endemicity. As one victim of war in a “failed state” made the point recently in Liberia 
(2003),  “I am always running from place to place, place to place”. (Philipps.2003) 
 
Diamonds, which have earned the sobriquet  “blood diamonds” on account of the bloody 
way in which they are won, and other strategic minerals sustain the warlords. In most of 
Africa’s “failed states”, the infiltration of small arms and their cheapness brings them 
easily into the hands of all and sundry. Failed states, by their very nature, as decomposing 
entities, diffuse their rot across borders and invariably endanger the security of their 
neighbouring states and regions. Unending cycles of lawlessness, violence, looting, 
pillage and rape marks everyday life. Production collapses as economically hemorrhaging 
depredations take their toll. With time, the “failed state” becomes an entity totally 
incapable of maintaining itself as a viable member of the international community and 
depends on charity and largess for its existence. “Failed states” in Africa are increasing in 
number.  
 
Africa’s wars are not entirely due to locally inspired factors. International interests have 
invariably colluded with different warring parties for purposes of financial gain and geo-
political interests. For one thing, the profusion of arms that have been flooding Africa, 
originate from the industrialized countries of the northern hemisphere. It is from these 
sources that sales are being made to African warring parties. In the World Bank Report, 
Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy, it is suggested that 
countries, which earn about a quarter of their Gross Domestic Product from raw materials 
have a far higher likelihood for civil war than countries with greater diversification of 
their economies. The report also argued that rebel insurgents loot primary resources in 
order to continue operations. (Anthony.2003.52) Since the beginning of the post-colonial 
era, mercenaries have been frequently employed in conflict situations, by both African 
governments and international mining interests, in pursuit of their interests. 
(Aning.2002.149-171) 
 
Africa in the Global Village 
In the new global village of the contemporary world, with countries and peoples living 
literally cheek to jowl, the touchstone for peaceful and prosperous coexistence is a 
pluralist paradigm in the international field, which allows diversity to flourish as a source 
of universal strength, and multi-lateralism as a methodological tool for the achievement 
of international order. The international community has lived with the ideal of peaceful 
coexistence since the foundation of the United Nations. But, by and large, people around   5
the globe are more connected to each other than ever before. Information and money flow 
more quickly than ever. The international marketplace has become tightly global. Goods 
and services produced in one part of the world are increasingly and quickly available in 
all parts of the world. International travel is common. This phenomenon has been titled 
"globalization".  In some people, globalization evokes feelings of triumph, the conquest 
of nature and the unity of humanity. Some others regard it as imperialism in our times. 
For others, it strikes fear, it is seen to mean an inevitable homogenization of experience 
and the hegemony of the powerful over the rest, in the emergent shared cultural space. 
Still others regard it as the destruction of individuality and existential freedom; the 
obliteration of the unique.  
 
Away from the material conditions of human existence, globalization is challenging the 
ability of smaller and weaker cultures in their diversity to share a common space, 
especially where rival nationalisms; power and religion intersect and vie for influence 
and hegemony. This, plus the attendant tensions of terrorism has led some, like Samuel 
Huntington to suggest a coming “clash of civilizations”.  Others argue more forcefully for 
the need to develop higher tolerance levels, stronger global consciousness and a 
purposefully constructed interdependence between peoples and cultures, “a dialogue of 
civilizations”.  
 
It is in these cultural realities that our humanity is ultimately defined. It is culture, which 
distinguishes us from and raises us above other animals. Humans learn and create culture 
as a social heritage, which is generationally transferred as material and non-material 
fabrication of the human genius. Thus, much as we make culture, culture makes and 
defines us both as individuals and as members of groups. Its assemblage of ideals, values 
and patterns of institutionalized behaviour, socialized symbols and shared meanings 
underscore the centrality of language. The social character of language and its function as 
the key transactional instrument for human groups makes it both the supreme divider and 
at the same time invisible instrument for uniting people. The shared civilization of 
humanity is based more on achieved social characteristics than ascribed criteria. How we 
manage diversity will determine whether we are successful in institutionalizing cultural 
pluralism in a democratic world or a divisive conflict-ridden scenario with mindless 
bloodletting as has been in recent years seen in the Eastern Congo and the Sudan. 
 
The Social and Cultural Structures of African Societies 
Africa is one of the most diversified cultural areas in the whole world. While such 
extensive diversity is not unique to Africa, given the geographical size of the continent as 
the second largest continent in the world, the profusion of this cultural variegation 
sometimes gives the impression of unending differences. Closer anthropological 
examination however reveals extensive convergences and structural similarities between   6
superficially distinct cultures. The traditional religious systems of Africa, in particular, 
display a great deal of formal and structural unity across the continent. The dynamics of 
clanship show very little variation over wide areas and often involve groups, which are 
considered to be distinct and which are scattered across existing state borders. Thus 
among the Sotho/Tswana peoples of Southern Africa clanship and the allied totemism of 
the Bakwena (crocodile people) involve communities in Lesotho, South Africa and 
Botswana. The Oyoko clan cuts across all the Akan groups of littoral West Africa, 
including, the Akyem, Asante, Akwamu, Akwapim, Fanti, Nzema, in Ghana, and the 
Brong, Agni, Baule, in the Ivory Coast. 
 
These cultural unities become even more perceptible when viewed as ethno-linguistic 
characteristics with age-long foundations. Most of what are counted as distinct languages, 
in Africa are actually dialects of what can be called “core languages”. Within each of 
these core languages there are mutually intelligible speech varieties or dialects.  Thus the 
Nguni cluster of mutually intelligible speech forms will include, Zulu, Xhosa, Swati, 
Kangwane, and Ndebele. Sotho-Tswana includes, Pedi, Sotho, Tswana, and Lozi. The 
two clusters, Nguni and Sotho-Tswana have speakers in six countries in each instance in 
the SADC region. What the Centre of Advanced Studies of African Society’s (CASAS) 
work has so far revealed is that as first, second or third language speakers (we need to 
remember that most Africans are multilingual), over 75% of Africans speak no more than 
12 core languages, these being, Nguni, Sotho-Tswana, Swahili, Amharic, Fulful, 
Mandenkan, Igbo, Hausa, Yoruba, Luo, Eastern Inter-lacustrine and Western Inter-
lacustrine (Kitara). 15 core languages will take us up to about 85% of the African 
population of the continent; the three additions being the Somali/Samburu/Rendille and 
Oromo/Borana clusters, the Gur group. The addition of languages like, Kikonga, Luba, 
Akan, Mbundu, Lingala and Ovimbundu takes the percentage of Africans to about 90 
percent.  For a population of 600 million to 700 million people, these languages cannot 
be described as small speech communities. These ethno-linguistic or cultural realities of 
Africa provide Africans with senses of identity, which often transcend the identities, 
which emerged under colonialism. 
 
The Colonial State and Ethnicity in Africa 
The colonial state and the defining borders, which have been largely inherited in the post-
colonial arrangement defied the age-long identities, which ordered the lives of Africans. 
Colonial power imprinted new identities and labels.  Little attention was paid to the 
implications of colonial borders for Africans. They negated the realities of African 
identities and autonomous African perceptions of the world. Asiwaju has made useful 
anecdotal references, which illustrate the confusions regarding such primordial references 
of identity among Africans arising out of the colonial border-demarcation activity at the 
junction of the 19
th and 20
th centuries.  “The Alaketu (King) of Ketu (Ketu is the   7
renowned ancient Yoruba city in the present-day Republic of Benin, formerly Dahomey) 
is reported to have said:  ‘We regard the boundary as separating the English and the 
French not the Yoruba’.  This statement is identical with that credited to a Maasai warrior 
protesting against the 1898 Anglo-German Boundary Commission carrying out the 
demarcation of the Laitokitok section of the present-day Kenya-Tanzania boundary; the 
commissioners, he said, ‘were labouring under a misapprehension, as the land belonged, 
not to the European, but to his own tribe …’ ” (Asiwaju.1985.9) The dissonance in 
perceptions between colonizer and colonized is both striking and telling.  The chief of 
Aflao (Ghana) in 1975 complained in the presence of the present author that in order to 
visit his subjects on the other side of the border (which runs along people’s backyards on 
both sides of the border), in Lome (Togo) he needs a passport.  
 
Thus the emergence of the colonial state meant a revision of the sense of identity, which 
Africans had prior to the establishment of colonial rule. These new terms of reference 
over-rode and downgraded the precolonial identities but, did not obliterate them. The 
precolonial identities were submerged, but continued to exert powerful influence on the 
thinking and practice of colonized Africans. This remained particularly so, for those 
whose mode of livelihood and existential conditions were close to their time-tested habits 
and traditional practices. Thus whereas those, like the new urbanites, who were more 
radically drawn into the economic, social and political nexus of colonial society accepted 
more easily the identities imposed by colonialism, for the teeming majorities whose lives 
and modes of livelihood were anchored more firmly in traditional and rural society, with 
interests closely tied to the old order, the new points of reference for identity, introduced 
by colonialism had a much lesser effect. But, for even these groups, colonialism 
suggested new ethnicities; labels and identification, based on colonial administrative 
units, missionary engendered linguistic identities and other novel points of identification.   
 
During the course of the colonial period colonial administrators and missionaries, 
sometimes through considerations of administrative expediency and conveniency, at 
other times through evangelical work, and biblical translations in particular, elevated 
small dialects and narrow local groups to the status of ‘tribes’ or ethnicities.  Some 
ethnologists have also been inordinately keen ‘to discover’ their own tribes, and in this 
drive ‘tribes’ have been ‘discovered’ which are more appropriately subunits of much 
larger groups and extended cultures.  Thus, the Bari-speaking peoples, i.e. the Mondari, 
Fajelu, Kakwa, Bari, Nyangbara of the Southern Sudan, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) and Uganda have been identified as separate groups when in fact they 
represent sub-sets of one ethno-linguistic and cultural formation. During the Banda era in 
Malawi, the Nyanja variety spoken in Malawi was, in order to stress ostensible cultural 
and state autonomy or separateness, insistently labeled as ciCerwa with an orthography 
distinct from the Zambian variety.  The Gbe-speaking peoples of West Africa, starting   8
from the Aja in Badagry/Nigeria, the Aja in Benin, the Fon in Benin, the Gun in Benin, 
the Mina in Benin, the Mina in Togo, the Ewe in Togo and the Ewe in Ghana have a 
broadly mutually intelligible speech form, and enjoy very proximate cultural patterns and 
customary usages. In the literature, they are treated as totally different ethnic groups. 
(Prah.2002) The same can be said for the groups the German adventurer Schweinfurth 
gave the name “Pygmies” in 1873.  The generic term for this ethno-cultural group is the 
Baka.  In the North of the Gabon they are called the Baka people.  In the East they are 
called the Bakoya people.  In the region of Lastoursville, they are called the Bakuyi 
people.  In the hills of Chaillu, they are called the Babongo people.  Near Moabi, they are 
the Barimba people.  While they come under these various names they are ethno-
culturally essentially the same people. 
 
In precolonial Southern Africa, the spectrum of Shona varieties actually ran from 
Mozambique, where the Ndau variety predominates, through possibly eight variants, 
ending up with Kalanga in the Northern Botswana border area. By the third decade of the 
20
th century, Catholic and Protestant missionaries had orthographically created three 
distinct written forms as separate languages out of this reality, to demarcate spiritual 
boundaries and catchment areas. Remarkably, although Trappist Marianhill missionaries 
and Jesuits were denominationally both Catholic they constructed ciManyika and Zezuru, 
both mutually Shona varieties as separate and distinct written languages. It is for these 
reasons that some have argued that ethnicity is a colonial invention. (Ranger.1989.127)  
 
This latter argument, however, throws the baby out with the dirty bathwater. While 
colonialism conveniently created ethnic labels for groups which were neither sufficiently 
distinct from their neighbours nor were regarded as separate or distinct from others by the 
people themselves, from precolonial times to the present, cultural features like kinship 
systems, belief systems and religious practices, mythology, languages, cultural value 
systems and other customary usages have been real. They are the sub-units of culture 
around which socialization occurs. As historical and societal categories they are hardly 
fictitious. Indeed, they characterize the lives and behaviour of most Africans. The 
challenge as Seyoum Hameso rightly suggests is to turn these realities to positive use 
through judiciously selected policies. (Hameso.1997) 
 
While most of African societies at the beginning of the colonial period had evolved 
elaborate state structures, others were only weakly stratified, while still others, showed 
only segmentary lineage and clan formations of tribal nature.  In most instances, 
interpenetrative institutional relations existed between proximate and cognate ethnic 
groups.  Some societies were oriented towards extensive long-distance trade, while others 
were more inward looking and localist in their political economies.  Identities, allegiances 
and loyalties revolved around, the lineage, the clan, the chief and cultural practices   9
related to these institutions, and not ethnicity per se, in the exclusivist sense that it is 
often understood today.  Ethnicity in precolonial Africa was generally not caste-like or 
closed.  Moshoeshoe’s Basotho kingdom was an amalgamation of elements from all over 
the area.  The Zulu constantly absorbed conquered or tributary states.  The same is true of 
Ashanti, Benin, Sokoto, the interlacustrine Bantu or the Tswana groups.  The Ila in 
Central Africa, the Karamojong, Suk, Turkana, Muerle, Didinga in Eastern Africa 
institutionalized the absorption of war captives and foreigners.  The list is hardly 
exhaustive.  Precolonial ethnic formations in Africa were largely in this sense open 
systems. (Prah.1997.1-25) 
 
Much in the literature has been made of the paradigms of “direct and indirect rule”.  
Obviously for those precolonial societies in which social differentiation and social 
stratification were minimal, colonialism in general and colonial administration in 
particular encouraged the articulation of social structures which would make colonial rule 
easier by contriving the elevation of headmen and lineage heads to positions of authority, 
far beyond what they enjoy in the traditional order.  Thus the age-long gerontocratic 
structures were systematically abrogated.  Sometimes such social engineering elicited 
stiff resistance from the wider populace.  In those societies where stratification and state 
formation was fairly well developed before the arrival of colonial power, the existing 
structures became easy and ready instrumentation for the control of the societies.  This 
was the hub of the Lugardian system.  In either case the usurpation of traditional power 
and social structures created sources of considerable and sometimes seething tension in 
African societies.   
 
Africa’s precolonial states ceased to have their political, economic and social meanings 
and implications with the onset of colonial power.  None of the precolonial states 
survived with its power untouched.  With the scramble for Africa and the partition of the 
continent the precolonial order was unceremoniously cast aside.  This profoundly 
affected allegiances and identities on the continent, especially, since the new order 
created new economic and social interests to which people became differentially 
identified depending on the stake they had in the new order.   
 
The Post-Colonial State and Ethnic Realities 
Part of the socio-political evolution which went on during the colonial period, especially 
during the late colonial era, was the establishment of the structure of what was to become 
the post-colonial state.  Between the end of the 19
th century and the beginning of the 
1960s colonial powers fashioned for different reasons new states, which were transferred 
to the rule of indigenous elites at the onset of post-colonial era.  These new states, more 
than the colonial states, asserted the basis for new identities.  Whereas colonial power 
from a position of great strength could tolerate, and indeed in many cases encouraged   10
ethnic identification, the post-colonial state in the name of unity denied, wished away, 
stamped under-foot or brushed under the carpet, all serious reference to ethnic identities 
and denied their place in the post-colonial, political, social and economic order. The 
generally espoused rationale for this has been that ethnicity is divisive and inimical to the 
unity of the post-colonial state. This refusal to accept the reality of ethno-cultural 
differentiation, and rather adopt policies and institutions, which enable Africans to enjoy 
the benefits of cultural pluralism and cultural freedom has been the bane of the post-
colonial state. 
 
Thus, while in the real world of everyday life Africans relied on their age-long ethno-
linguistic affinities, at the level of state power and organization the tendency was to deny 
the reality of ethnicity. It was against the danger of railroading ethnic identities into an 
artificial unity that both Obafemi Awolowo and Nnamdi Azikiwe warned Nigerians in 
the 1960s. (Azikiwe.1964.22-28; Awolo.1968.83-89) Busia’s wisdom, in turn, was that, 
“as we see it, the social realities suggest that a sounder approach to the problem of 
tribalism in Africa is to accept the fact of pluralism, rather than fly in the face of the facts 
and attempt to achieve monolithic structures through coercion.  It is no sign of 
backwardness to recognize the fact of the existence of different tribes and ethnic groups, 
nor is it reactionary to seek accommodation with tribal loyalties.  Ethnic groups exist 
everywhere in the world.” (Busia.1967.27-34)  
 
Ethnic sectionalism, which is generally known as tribalism, defines the interests of the 
ethnicity above wider interests. It is a phenomenon in which favour and preference tends 
to be advised by largely ethnic considerations. So that, whereas more open and relevant 
criteria should guide the selection of people and options in an open and fair basis, ethnic 
allegiances become overriding factors in the selection of people for office or options in 
policy-making and implementation. Much of such practices can be avoided if selection 
processes are open and transparent so that justice is not only done but is also, seen to be 
done. It is misleading, as is often the case, to suggest that mass society in Africa is 
fundamentally prone to tribalism even when the rules of the game of modern politics 
forbid such practices.  
 
The case rather is that, in the competition for resources, under conditions of steadily 
diminishing availability of resources, rival elites employ ethnic sentiments as mobilizing 
instruments to gain power, control and access to resources and resource management.  
Such realities are aggravated by the expanding poverty in African societies.  It is for these 
same reasons that corruption has become such a pandemic problem in African societies. 
Anyang’ Nyong’o has rightly suggested that, “I do not think that what is really ruining 
Africa’s chances for development is simply corruption.  Corruption is the end result of a 
trait that is pathological in the culture of the ruling elite.  It begins with the endemic   11
impulse to want to escape poverty through the use of political power and the exhibition of 
a culture of richness that must be displayed in ostentation and consumption. The more 
ostentatious one becomes the more one wants to improve on the artifacts of ostentation, 
be they houses, cars, wives, holidays, rings, public donations and so on.  This propels a 
never-ending consumer culture that, of necessity, must misappropriate public goods and 
misuse public power.” (Nyong'o.2002.101)
 
   
The Post-Colonial State and Resource Allocation 
The agrarian base of the colonial state was oriented towards primary produce for the 
metropoles of the contemporary world.  Mining and related activity held most of the 
limited industrial infrastructure of the colonial state.  The post-colonial state has not been 
able to seriously improve the productive capacity of African states as inherited from the 
colonial era.  Accumulation processes and structures were for citizens poorly developed, 
and the capacity to transfer capital generationally is only rudimentarily successful. In as 
far as inheritance is concerned, Africans need to learn to be more custodians than 
consumers.  
 
Creative institutional changes will need to be in place if modern production is to acquire 
a variegated skill-based productive population, literate in local languages and able to 
transfer skills and knowledge on the basis of the so-called cross-border languages of 
Africa.  Indeed, almost all African languages are cross-border.  Language in Africa is 
invariably a cross-border speech-form.  Less than five percent of Africans speak only 
languages understood within the borders of the country in which they live. 
 
The Chronology of War in Africa 
While colonialism brought precolonial wars to a close, colonialism itself was met with 
wars of resistance throughout Africa. Such resistance was not infrequently grounded in 
millenarian and messianic ideology, which drew on the traditional institutions of ritual 
and religion.  
 
For the first part of the 20
th century, African wars were in effect anti-colonial in object. 
From the beginning of the 1
st World War Africans were drawn into the conflict of 
imperialist rivalry as soldiers of the rival imperial powers. The wars of resistance 
however trickled on until the Nuer Settlement in the early 1930s. In the words of Evans 
Pritchard, “the Nuer likewise treated British rule with open disrespect till, as a result of 
lengthy military operations between 1928 and 1930, their opposition was broken and they 
were brought under effective administration.” (Evans-Pritchard.1940.282) From the 
middle of the century onwards, as part of the struggles for colonial freedom, armed 
struggle against Portuguese colonial rule and settler colonial rule emerged. The “Land 
and Freedom War” otherwise called the Mau Mau Uprising in Kenya commenced in   12
1952 with the declaration of an emergency. The Algerian war of independence was next 
in the queue. The first war for independence in Portuguese colonial Africa started in 
Guinea Bissao and Cape Verde in August 1959 after the Pidjiguiti Massacre. Portuguese 
Africa was in ferment. In March 1961 war against Portuguese colonialism was launched 
in Angola. Three years later in September 1964 Mozambican freedom fighters also 
initiated an armed struggle. In the settler-colonial areas, after some procrastination, two 
years after the white-settler Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in November 
1965, in 1967 the war for colonial freedom was launched. The South West Africa 
People’s Organization (SWAPO) started its armed struggle for independence, in August 
1966. In South Africa, where settler rule was most entrenched, after the Sharpeville 
Massacre of 1960 preparations for armed resistance started in earnest. Poqo and Mkonto 
We Sizwe became the first manifestations of this.  
 
With the exception of the case of Guinea Bissao and Cape Verde, none of the insurgents 
in the wars of independence in Africa, since the 1950s have been able to maintain a 
totally united front in the war against colonial power. This splintering of the nationalist 
front was stimulated by the Cold War, but the mobilization and exploitation of ethnic 
sentiments by contesting leaderships; the manipulation of rivalries and localism also 
played a not insignificant role. Angolan, Mozambican, Zimbabwean, Namibian and 
South African freedom fighters were all divided. In Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwe African 
Peoples Union (ZAPU) was associated with Ndebele leadership. SWAPO in Namibia 
was seen as Ovambo dominated. In Mozambique there have been suggestions that the 
Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) was directed by southerners and in Angola, 
by assimilados and mestize, as opposed to the National Union for the Total Independence 
of Angola (UNITA), which was predominantly Ovimbundu in leadership. This sort of 
perceived sectionalism had an effect on the profundity of the independence dispensation, 
the political and economic content of what in the end was achieved.  In the cases of 
Angola and Mozambique, independence ushered in a new era of war between elements of 
the previous anticolonial nationalists.  In the case of Mozambique, the Mozambican 
National Resistance (RENAMO), which went to war against the FRELIMO government, 
was initially a proxy instrument of Rhodesian securocrats and the apartheid regime in 
South Africa.  In the Angolan case, South Africa and the Western world supported 
UNITA while the Soviet Union and its allies supported the MPLA in the postcolonial 
civil war, which continued until 2002. (Prah.1999.51-52) 
 
In the last three decades of the century, civil wars became increasingly rampant.  Africa 
has experienced innumerable coups or palace revolutions since the onset of the 
independence era.  This period started with the Zanzibar revolution of 1964, which 
overthrew the sultanate.  The Nigerian coup of 1965 was quickly followed by the 
Ghanaian coup, which overthrew the Nkrumah regime.  Over the years Africa has seen as   13
many coups as Latin America.  The coups represent intra-elitist “changing of the guards”. 
None of the coups that have taken place in Africa can in any serious sense be said to be 
emancipatory as far as the broader sections of the population are concerned.  The first 
Nigerian coup led directly to the commencement of the civil war.  Ethnic affiliations 
were exploited by politicians and soldiers in the instigation of both the coup and the civil 
war, which followed.  The perception was rife that it was a war between the Igbo and the 
Hausas, with the Yoruba siding with the North, i.e. the Hausa.  In actual fact, control over 
oil resources by rival elites was the hard economic basis of the war. 
 
Ethnic factors have been consistently utilized from the colonial period as a mobilizing 
agent in African politics.  A Fang migration legend was used to rally the dispersed Fang 
groups of Gabon and Cameroon the common purpose of ending colonial rule.  A Yoruba 
myth served as the basis of establishing the ‘Society of the Children of Oduduwa’ for the 
purpose of uniting the people of the Western Region of Nigeria.  Bakongo mythology has 
been used for political purposed by Kasavubu’s ABAKO party in the Congo, Luena and 
Chokwe should unite in support of Tshombe and his CONAKAT party, or conversely 
why the Luena and Chokwe should unite to oppose the Lunda. (Bascom.1965.477) In 
post-colonial politics, such manipulation of ethnic sentiments and mythology has 
continued. During Daniel arap Moi’s rule in Kenya (1978-2003), or the Mobutu Sese 
Seko’s period in Zaire (1965-97), ethnic groups were consistently been played against 
each other to prevent the emergence of a broad, coherent and unified opposition block 
capable of challenging and unseating these regimes. In the decade leading up to the 
commencement of the second civil war (1983) in the Sudan, Numeiri successfully used 
such tactics to divide the Southerners. Migration myths are today, being used by diamond 
and gold-looting warlords to mobilize support among opposing Hema and Lendu groups. 
 
Oyetade has drawn attention to the fact that in Nigeria there has been a tendency for 
political party affiliation and voting patterns to be mobilized along ethnic lines.  The 
1973 National Census was cancelled on account of suspicions that one particular ethnic 
group had been over-represented in the voting register after the Civil War.  There 
emerged ethnically based groups, “which came into existence to champion the cause of 
particular ethnic groups.  Mention could be made of the Afenifere and the Oduduwa a 
Peoples Congress (OPC), for the Yoruba; the Arewa and the Turaki groups for the 
Hausa/Fulani, the Indigbo – The Pan Igbo Cultural Association, The Movement for the 
Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra, all for the Igbo ethnic group.  The Ijaw 
Youth Movement, Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, etc.” 
(Oyetade.2003.106) These groups emerged, ostensibly, to protect the interests of the 
ethnic groups concerned in the face of  “the intense competition between the elites for the 
control of the economic, political and social infrastructures of the country.” (ibid.) 
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The civil wars in postcolonial Africa have been testing the political assumptions and 
foundations of the postcolonial state.  The Nigerian civil war, the Ethiopian civil war and 
the Eritrean independence struggle, the Sudanese, Liberian, Senegalese, Sierra Leonean, 
Somali, Angolan and Mozambican civil wars have all raised the problems of regionalist 
and ethnic factors in the structural arrangements of the postcolonial state.  How far has a 
unifying state, copied from the European nation-state model, permitted the existence of 
localist sentiments in democratic organization?  This structural shortcoming of the 
postcolonial state has been largely accountable for the tensions and conflicts we have 
seen and continue to see.  Phenomena like the Mati Miho movement in Ghana an Ashanti 
based of the 1950s and 60s; the Kabaka Yekka a Baganda derived formation in Uganda; 
Inkatha a Zulu based rival of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa; the 
Oduduwa/Yoruba movement and the Ewe unity movement of Togo and Ghana, all 
demonstrate the structural inadequacies of the postcolonial state. There is need for 
policies, which in no way stifle cultural expression, but rather, welcome diversity in a 
collectively enriching social environment. 
 
The structure of the postcolonial state would benefit from openings, which allow for the 
accommodation of democratic institutions, with respect for cultural and ethnic diversity. 
Such approaches will ensure that the road to peace in Africa is not fraught with 
internecine conflict.  This can be achieved under wider pan-Africanist structures which, 
while recognizing the realities of the heritage of the postcolonial state, endeavour to 
create cross-border institutions of cultural, economic and social relevance, in such a way 
that they enhance democratic expression, the cultivation of civil and collective rights of 
cultural groupings, and wider African markets and production units, without pandering to 
territorial balkanization or Bantustan solutions.  The celebration of diversity under a 
common African unitary institution appears to be the realistic approach to ethnic, 
regionalist and localist conflicts in Africa.  Herein also lies the route to an African 
renaissance, the institutional development of labour and capital across borders. 
(Prah.1999.52-53) 
 
Ethnicity, Language, Religion and Conflict in Africa 
Intolerant and misguided policies in the cultural and linguistic field have been responsible 
for creating conflict scenarios.  In some countries like the Sudan, South Africa and 
Ethiopia, language policy issues have become in recent decades, the flashpoint for bloody 
conflict and civil strife. Undemocratic politics of language is never far from ethnic 
tensions. Cultural and linguistic Arabization has been the ideological bone of contention 
of the Sudanese conflict since the late 1950s when with the impending departure of 
British colonial power, African fears of Arabization and economic and political 
dominance was ignited by the Torit Mutiny (17
th August 1955) which propelled the 
Sudan into the conflict which has lingered on to the present. The rejection of Afrikaans as   15
a medium of education by South African youth in 1976 in Soweto proved to be a decisive 
turning point in the struggle against Apartheid and white minority rule in South Africa. A 
principal and underlying factor in the Ethiopian conflicts, which has shredded the fabric 
of the society in recent decades, has been the revolt against Amhara cultural dominance 
within the contemporary Ethiopian state. Oromo linguistic and political resurgence has 
become the latest manifestation this fissiparous history. Insurgents in Ethiopia have 
placed the use of native languages at the centre of their demands for autonomy. For 
decades, resistance to Amhara cultural domination especially regarding language-use has 
been a rallying issue for those opposed to successive governments in Addis Ababa. In 
Ghana, for decades, some politicians particularly among Akans have derisively referred 
to the Ewe language as “channel nine”, implying that it is a language of secrecy and 
conspiracy; a language nobody understands. In the Sudan, resistance to Arabism by the 
majority has found much expression in resistance to the use of the Arabic language by 
Africans particularly in the South of the country.   
 
In South Africa until the rise of the Afrikaner elite, much of the rivalry between Boer and 
Brit found manifestation in the struggles of the Afrikaners to place their language (Taal) 
on an equal footing with the English language, a language which Boer nationalist leaders 
regarded as 'the language of the oppressor'. The rapid development and supremacy of 
Afrikaans under Apartheid took place mainly over the past fifty years. In time, with the 
application of Broederbond advocacy and generous governmental support with resource 
and single-minded patronage, the white Afrikaner was able to raise the status and role of 
his  'kombuis taal' (kitchen language) to equality in most senses of the word by the 
mid-sixties.  This period also saw the rapid improvement of the economic fortunes of the 
Afrikaans-speaking group. From the situation of the language spoken by a relatively 
deprived group at the turn of the century, significantly developed in its early years by the 
so-called Coloured group, by the end of the sixties, Afrikaans in its standardised and 
educationally taught form had become the social prerogative of the white Afrikaner elite 
and was fast becoming a language embodying some of the most advanced ideas of 
science and technology in the twentieth century.  
 
In Eastern Africa, during the past two decades the role and significance of Swahili has 
increased.  Today the usage of Swahili with official blessing covers Tanzania, Kenya, 
Uganda, and Zaire (about a third in geographical spread of Black Africa). The expansion 
in usage of Swahili has also in its wake generated debate about whether this expansion 
should be allowed to proceed at the expense/neglect of the other indigenous languages 
and older African languages of the area.  In the Central African Republic, Sango, which 
is understood by most, is beginning to societally feature as a lingua franca, the same way 
Swahili does in East Africa. 
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The social superiority, which the usage of European languages gives in African society, 
has grown in most of Africa since the commencement of the post-colonial period. There 
is in Africa today, little remarkable contestation of the extended hegemony of the 
colonially received languages.  
 
European languages in Africa have a history of association with the development of an 
elite created and culturally shaped in the image of the westerner. During the colonial 
period, to ensure the effective running of the colonial project, it was important for the 
authorities to have an indigenous cadre culturally and linguistically groomed to facilitate 
entry into colonial society. Such natives who culturally had one leg in the culture of the 
colonized and another leg in the culture of the colonizer served as a bridge or entry point 
for the colonial enterprise. There is no evidence that under colonial rule the intention was 
to totally replace African language-use with European languages at the level of mass 
society. Africans were taught in their own languages only at the elementary levels of 
education. Beyond that they were to carry on in English, French or Portuguese. This 
approach was earmarked for the elite. For mass society it was implicitly understood that 
people would carry on in their own languages. The postcolonial state in Africa, inherited 
this policy and although, sometimes, African ruling groups have questioned its wisdom, 
no serious attempt was made to alter it. Thirty to forty years down the road, European 
languages have so far failed to reach the rural population and urban underclass in any 
meaningful way. Their social dominance has however continued to grow, and they have 
continued to socially entrench amongst the elites.  
 
The overwhelming masses of Africans continue to live in fairly coherent tradition-bound 
communities in rural Africa, and have scant or sketchy understanding of European 
languages, social relations and regular communication is carried out largely through the 
usage of their indigenous languages.  Needless to say, it is in these languages that 
Africans display their core abilities and creativity within their environments.  It is also 
remarkable that these languages represent the socio-cultural and historical repositories of 
the overall cultural patterns and usages of African people.  In other words, African 
languages are today possibly the most crucial factor in the propagation and development 
of culture, science and technology based on known and historical foundations rooted in 
the practices of the people. Additionally, the argument can be advanced that sustained 
development, in an overarching sense, which engages the grassroots of African societies 
can be achieved by building on indigenous usages and knowledge bases. African 
development projects and efforts have the greatest chance of success if innovative ideas 
and their communication are couched in indigenous languages, which reach the rural 
masses more immediately and more directly. The attitudinal ambivalence of those 
elements in African society whose livelihood and way of life hinges of the use of   17
European languages poses difficulties for the societal approval of the use of African 
languages 
 
Most interested parties in Africa tend to admit that some western languages have 
currently a universal quality and common global currency for which reasons, they must 
be maintained as second or third languages by Africans in the search for universal social 
intercourse.  However, increasingly the view is emerging that much of this expansion has 
been taking place in conditions under which indigenous African languages are being 
relatively fossilized, en route to extinction.   
 
In some countries disingenuous policies, insensitivity and competition for pre-eminence 
amongst African languages has tended to fuel feelings and attitudes of dominance and 
"tribalism" amongst the wider citizenry.  Such tensions have in the past been particularly 
acute amongst the Ibo, Yoruba and Hausa of Nigeria, the Akan groups and the Ewe in 
Ghana and Togo, the Kalanga and Tswana of Botswana, the Shona and Ndebele of 
Zimbabwe, the Bantu speaking groups and the Nilotics of Uganda, the Kran and 
Gio/Mano in Liberia, to mention a few.  Only fair, even and balanced treatment of the 
cultural and linguistic rights of all citizens based on clear equalitarian principles can deal 
effectively with this situation. 
 
The contribution the Centre for Advanced Studies of African Society (CASAS) has made 
to the debate on language of instruction (LoI) policies in Africa is that, while language is 
certainly not the only important factor in African development it is definitely a very 
crucial factor in human and societal development.  It is the social grid on which the 
development process is constructed.  Africa can hardly move forward in human 
development if it continues to base its development endeavours culturally on the received 
colonial languages.  Elsewhere the present author has argued that the use of African 
languages for education and human development will strengthen the sense of collective 
cultural confidence attached to the local production and reproduction of knowledge in 
languages understood by the wider citizenry.  This argument is beginning to win support.  
Most international organizations, donor groups and education specialists are agreed about 
the fact that language of instruction policies in education should definitely use African 
languages consistently at the primary level.  The Association for the Development of 
Education in Africa (ADEA) in a report put out on behalf of African Ministers of 
Education indicated that: 
 
  On the question of pedagogical effectiveness, research shows that  (language of 
instruction) LoI policies that favour mother tongues in the early years of basic 
education result in improved and faster acquisition of knowledge by pupils.   
Furthermore, mother-tongue LoI is effective in promoting the acquisition of 
second-language competencies.  On the issue of cultural development and the   18
promotion of individual and collective identities, research (though limited) shows 
that LoI policies favouring the use of African lingua francas result in students; 
developing integrative attitudes across ethnic groups (Kenya).  It should be noted 
that these findings are contrary to the previously held assumption that theuse of 
African lingua francas as LoIs or as official languages would prove to be 
ethnically divisive. (IDRC.1997.xiv) 
 
Most African governments accept this viewpoint but few are willing to advance the 
resources necessary to realize these objectives.  In the short term, it is necessary for 
African countries to implement the policy of utilizing African languages for primary 
education.  In the long run one would further argue that policies should be put in place to 
realize the use of African languages at all levels of education, and widespread use in all 
areas of social life. (Prah.2003) 
 
What is also obviously required is that African languages need to be developed in such a 
way that they can be utilized.  The first step is to harmonize those languages, which enjoy 
a high level of mutual intelligibility so that on the economies of scale it is possible to 
produce books for large speech communities.  CASAS has over the past six years worked 
actively in this field and pioneered the development of new and revised orthographies for 
the very large African languages.  CASAS’ work in this field is beginning to attract the 
strong attention of some of the authorities on the continent.  The Ministry of Education of 
the Government of South Africa has expressed active interest in the harmonization of 
South African languages.  Contacts are being forged with the Namibian Ministry of 
Education.  Initial steps have been taken to work with the Angolan authorities in this 
respect.  The Gabonese Ministry of National Education in 2003 invited the Director of 
CASAS for discussions on the possible harmonization of Gabonese languages.  Similar 
discussions have been held with the Minister of Education in Ghana. These developments 
represent positive steps in the right direction.  The opposition to the use of African 
languages in education in Africa is related to the fact that the cultural base for the 
influence and power of the elite is tied to the use of the colonial languages.  Furthermore 
even where the logic of the argument for the use of African languages in the education is 
clear there is an inertia created by the fact that the familiar policies and practices of the 
past are difficult to change.  It is easier for the authorities to stick to practices they know 
than adopt practices they do not know.   
 
Elites, Resource Management and War in Post-Colonial Africa 
The elites, which have dominated post-colonial states in Africa, have been mostly social 
elements with little or no independent socio-economic bases.  In Africa elite formation 
have gone on hand-in-hand with education.  For most, it is through education that social 
mobility has been achieved.  However in recent decades a new element has emerged in 
elite formation, which is based not so much on the elevation which education brings but   19
rather the emblems of social success which purchasing power provides.  The ethos of 
admiration for the educated has over the past three decades receded in significance when 
compared to admiration for societally demonstrated access to wealth and conspicuous 
consumption. It is arguable that a good part of the youth in contemporary Africa are not 
as much concerned with how wealth is acquired but more with access to wealth by fair or 
foul means.  This ethos does not therefore frown on corruption, graft or greed.  Too many 
have seen educated people unable to put three square meals on the table per day and see 
corrupt public figures amass wealth through illegal, criminal and other unethical means.  
In the face of the diminishing fortunes of African states, rivalry by elites for resources has 
become more intense.  Civilian elites rob state coffers under conditions of expanding 
pauperisation of the masses.  This scenario lends itself to the emergence of armed gangs, 
thugs and warlords who then compete with the others for resources in collapsing 
economies.    
 
The ultimate price during the Sierra Leone civil war of the 1990s was the control of the 
rich Kono and Tongo diamond fields. During the late stages of the civil war in Angola, 
on both the government side as well as the rebel side, the general and warlords helped 
themselves to the mineral wealth of the country. In the Sudan, government officers in the 
war in the South have looted at will, while some of the insurgents have also forcibly 
extracted resources from the general populace.  
 
Cultural Pluralism and the Myth of the Unitary State 
The post-colonial state in Africa has been in all instances multi-ethnic and multi-cultural 
in character.  At the beginning of the independence period there were many who felt that 
a centralized unitary structure of the state was crucial to the survival of the countries. 
This was because it was felt that given the diversity of ethnic groups within a state any 
attempt to allow political expression along ethnic lines would tend to break up the newly 
emergent states.  As a result of this reasoning, African states invariably pursued policies 
of almost zero tolerance to expressions of ethnic or cultural affiliation or the construction 
of political parties bases on regionalist, localist or ethnic identities.   
 
With the benefit of hindsight it is clear that the attempts to insist on centralized unitary 
models have in almost all instances failed.  There was too much of an attempt to deny the 
reality of ethno-cultural sub-units within the wider state.  So that, instead of creating a 
framework for the democratic expression of diversity, such diversity was rejected by the 
ruling parties, at all cost.  Whilst this repudiation of ethnic affiliations took place, at the 
same time, many members of the political elite sought support from their constituencies 
by exploiting ethnic sentiment.  The lessons of the past would suggest that in order to 
avoid ethnic affiliations being utilized for political objectives by elites, it would be more 
beneficial to acknowledge ethnic diversity and rather give this democratic institutional   20
form.  A World Bank report of 2000, which examined 47 civil wars between 1960 and 
1999, suggested that civil wars are more often caused by rebel insurgents competing with 
governments for resources, than political, ethnic or other factors. (Anthony.2003.53) 
 
The Regionalization of Conflict in Africa 
Over the past decade and a half Africa’s wars have invariably acquired regional 
character.  War in the Casamance in the south of Senegal, for the part of the insurgents, 
feeds on the solidarity of ethno-linguistic constituencies in Guinea Bissau and Guinea.  
Likewise the civil wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia exploited cultural sentiments from 
related ethnicities in the Ivory Coast and Guinea.  One of the charges that have been 
made by insurgents in Liberia is that support for the war in Liberia has been partly based 
in Sierra Leone.  The charge has also been made that the Sierra Leonean warlord Foday 
Sankoh was aided and abetted by Charles Taylor in Liberia. Indeed, after Charles 
Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) brutal war of ascendancy, he helped 
to create the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) of Sierra Leone and in exchange was 
remunerated with diamonds and concessions in Sierra Leone.  These cases show how 
mineral wealth and access to this is pursued through the exploitation of primordial ethno-
cultural affiliations.  
 
Angolan forces have operated in the Congo-Brazzaville. Zimbabweans, Angolans and 
Namibians have fought in the Congo DRC. Mineral extraction has been a factor in some 
of these involvements. Libya has, over the years, sometimes supported with resources at 
other times with armed forces both governments and insurgents in a host of African 
countries including the Sudan, Chad, Niger, the Central African Republic and Uganda.  
The implication of this process of regionalizing African conflicts is that the solutions to 
these conflicts can no longer be considered to be restricted to parties within the countries 
concerned.  Collective African effort and solutions have become crucial to the settlement 
of war and conflict in Africa.  Such multi-lateral approaches to conflict resolution in 
Africa are likely to increase in the coming years. (Anthony.2003.52-57, see note 1) 
 
Democracy in an Era of Reconstruction 
If democracy is the most efficient political principle of our times, how can Africa 
pursuing the institutionalization of democratic practice utilize the democratic principle as 
a successful instrument for social development, in the emergent era of reconstruction or 
renaissance? A number of relevant points need to be made in the above respect. For one 
thing, democracy, cannot be imposed by force of arms, it evolves. It is nurtured to grow 
and deepen. It must also wear the habitments of the local culture. Democracy in Africa 
must mean the involvement, participation and sovereignty of the majorities in the 
selection of policy, implementation, and control of instruments of leadership.  Use of the   21
languages and cultures of the mass society are crucial for the development of democratic 
cultures at the grassroots of society.  
 
Decentralization provides a structural lead to the infrastructure of a democratic culture. 
Decentralization permits the exercise of democratic rights at the local level, at which 
point most Africans carry out their everyday activities. The translation of democracy to 
satisfy representation and voice at the most local setting, for example at the village level, 
empowers people at the social points in which they most need to have a say and 
influence. Decentralization brings the possibility of democracy to the elementary 
structures of social organization. 
 
Democracy in Africa will be unattainable if human rights are not societally 
acknowledged and respected.  A society, which respects human rights, is very well on the 
way towards the cultivation of democracy.  But human rights must be clearly understood 
to refer not only to individuals but also to groups including cultural units of wider 
society.  Cultural freedom, tolerance, pluralism, and the permeability of cultural borders 
are ideals of democrats in our times.  Democrats not only tolerate difference but also 
celebrate diversity. “Failed states” cannot operate democratic systems. They are, indeed, 
the direct opposite of democratic orders. Likewise, democracy in Africa cannot survive 
economic collapse. Democracy thrives best in buoyant economies. 
 
The Principle of Celebrating the Local in a Globalizing World 
Closely allied to the necessity to construct democracy in Africa from the most elementary 
units of social organization is the need to allow political difference and cultural variety to 
be displayed, acknowledged, honoured and celebrated. This principle, we would argue, is 
true in both national and international contexts. The logic of multi-culturalism and 
composite cultures is a simple one. Given our diversity, the need to tolerate and celebrate 
difference is the only rational way to collectively prosper. There is also the inherent 
wisdom in preserving the rich variegation of social and cultural habits created and rooted 
deeply in the past.  Cultural freedom offers the best approach to the management of 
diversity. 
 
Politically the idea of democratic pluralism captures the mood and need of our times. The 
pursuit of democratic pluralism bets on diversity, instead of regarding cultural diversity 
as a source of social disunity. The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity 
(2001), which is the first of its kind within the international community, has elevated 
cultural diversity to the status of 'common heritage of humanity - as necessary for the 
human race as bio-diversity in the natural realm'. Accordingly, the defense and protection 
of cultural diversity is an ethical imperative, which is inseparable from respect for human 
dignity. The Convention emphasizes the understanding of moving from cultural diversity   22
to cultural pluralism. "In our increasingly diverse societies, it is essential to ensure 
harmonious interaction among people and groups with plural, varied and dynamic 
cultural identities as well as their willingness to live together. Policies for the inclusion 
and participation of all citizens are guarantees of social cohesion, the vitality of civil 
society and peace. Thus defined, cultural pluralism gives policy expression to the reality 
of cultural diversity. Indissociable from a democratic framework, cultural pluralism is 
conducive to cultural exchange and to the flourishing of creative capacities that sustain 
public life." (UNESCO.2001) Human rights as guarantees for cultural diversity; cultural 
rights as an enabling environment for cultural diversity; the preservation and cultivation 
of cultural heritage; and access for all to cultural diversity are issues that have been 
appropriately recognized by the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity. 
(MONDIACULT.1982) 
 
The permeability of ethnic borders is crucial for pluralism.  To share, people must cross 
cultural demarcations and freely select affiliation at will.  The more we augment scope 
for communion, the more enriching and fulfilling the offering of homo sapiens as a 
historical and cultural producer and product can make to Africans as global players both 
individually and collectively. An important ingredient for the flourishing of multi-
culturalism and cultural diversity is the need to ensure the institutions of secularism and 
religious tolerance. Non-African citizenry with historical, religious and cultural roots in 
other continents will need to enjoy equal and even treatment in African states as a matter 
of policy. A global village means that, more than ever, differing religious groups exists 
side-by-side.  For peace to prevail and citizens to enjoy equal rights religion has to be 
removed from the ambit of the state.  While religion and ritual can be openly practiced in 
their variegation, religious confession must be treated as an attribute belonging to the 
private domain of citizens.  The state in the global world should stay out of the arena of 
religious practice.   
 
Policies Towards Conflict Resolution 
In Africa terror is primarily carried out by warlords, brigands and, states which terrorize 
their own citizenry.  Arguably, the pressures for democratic governance have increased 
over the past two decades and governments are continuously under pressure by civil 
society in Africa for more open and democratic rule.  Whilst some progress has been 
made over the past decade in countries like Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, Angola and 
Madagascar, there are other areas where deterioration in human rights and the 
acknowledgements of civil liberties are increasingly in question.   
 
Many of the over forty-odd sub-Saharan states which have come to political 
independence since the 1960s have for a large part become or becoming “failed states”, 
with unviable economies, poor governance, cultural and ethnic intolerance and both   23
Christian and Muslim fundamentalism (with Christian fundamentalism taking the form of 
fanatical pentecostalism).  If Africa and Africans are to begin to transform African 
societies, pan-African institutions which emphasize cooperation would need to be 
developed.  Wide pan-African umbrella institutions will diminish the strength of ethnic 
affiliations in the post-colonial African state and permit cross-border linkages, which 
have long historical and cultural roots. 
 
Traditional modes of reconciliation speak easily and primordially to the masses of Africa.  
They therefore represent very crucial and useful instruments for conflict resolution.  The 
use of such institutions in recent times in the Great Lakes area, particularly after the 
genocide in Rwanda, has had limited but recognizable success.  A judicious adaptation of 
traditional peace-making institutions to contemporary needs for societies, which are 
largely tradition-bound would be useful and possibly more meaningful than the 
imposition of norms and ideas which are totally strange to erstwhile conflicting 
communities.  “Extreme ideologies” which exacerbate ethnic tensions need to be exposed 
at very early stages of their emergence.  But perhaps more crucially, advocacy of the 
ethos of democratic pluralism and the peaceful co-existence of diverse socio-cultural 
groups needs to be advanced and propagandized as a matter of policy.  The creation of 
ethnic mythologies, ethnogenesis and the use by rival elites needs to be exposed and 
unmasked so that the drift into conflict as we have seen in the Great Lakes area can be 
avoided. (Lemarchand.1999)  
 
Closing Remarks 
African ethnicities cannot be obliterated.  In itself, ethnicity does not cause conflict. In 
the context of the unitary structure of the post-colonial state, ethnicity is a possible fault 
line, which reacts to deeper socio-political and economic factors. It has been consistently 
mobilized in Africa by elites, as an instrument, to justify the pursuit of leadership 
interests and access to resources, to the point of resorting to conflict in order to achieve 
these ends. In fact, ethnicity can be put to constructive use if it is given democratic 
expression in a pluralist, tolerant, transparent and secular society. Ethnic diversity should 
be celebrated and turned to Africa’s advantage, so that culturally and sociologically it 
becomes an enriching patrimony with permeable borders which wider society enjoys in a 
free and accessible fashion.  Cultural space should be available so that cultural variation 
is openly tolerated and hegemony or tribalism becomes meaningless and pointless.  The 
institutions for the cultivation of diversity can only be cross-border since all African 
ethnicities are cross-border phenomena. Inter-state cooperation and pan-Africanist 
approaches are therefore crucial. Appropriate policies need to be put in place to enable 
cultural pluralism to flourish. 
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Durable peace in Africa requires much more than what can be described as limited ‘fire 
brigade operations’ which may put the lid on the immediacy of a given case of festering 
conflict, but does not address the root causes of war.  The roots of war in Africa are 
primarily economic and political. They are conditions which have histories rooted in the 
colonial past, the checker-board of economically unviable states arbitrarily created by the 
departing colonial powers, with no respect for Africa’s cultural, economic and political 
realities.  
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Notes 
1.  “War and the migratory labour process are contributing immensely to the 
expansion of the HIV pandemic in Africa. The pandemic is affecting the most 
productive sectors of the African population.  Amongst miners, peasants and 
farmers, teachers, health workers, students and pupils, hawkers, etc, on a daily 
basis, the pandemic keeps destroying the demographic and expertise profile of 
Africa’s working population.  The emergence on a large scale of a socially 
disempowered orphan class of people in both rural and urban areas taxes the 
capacities of African countries to provide the sort of social support and welfare 
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